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2. EU Energy Security Policies and Azerbaijan  
 
Carlo Frappi 
Introduction 
One of the most important features that characterized and accompanied the 
advent of the post-bipolar system was the progressive loss of meaning of the 
concept of “security”, as it was conceived in the Cold War period. In the post-
bipolar system, threats to the actors of the international community – be they 
states, individuals or groups of individuals – indeed seem to no longer come 
primarily from the military sphere, at least not in the classic conception of the 
risk of armed conflict between sovereign states. Therefore, since the early years 
following the end of the Cold War, reinterpretation of the concept of security 
has become a central feature in the strategic studies literature. Against this 
background, in parallel the traditional “strategic” connotation of the concept 
of security has gone from an interpretation now encompassing “enlarged” 
which includes the new threats of economic, environmental and Social Com-
mittee1. A new and “enlarged” conception of security – encompassing threats 
of an economic, environmental and social nature – has emerged alongside the 
traditional “strategic” connotation of security. Very different in their contents, 
the two conceptions of security also vary in relation to the mechanisms of pro-
tection from the threats – which change in form, depth of action and interlocu-
tors. Indeed, the need to defend against threats of an economic, environmental 
and social nature entails more technical tools, carried out to an increasing ex-
                                                          
1 On the evolution of the debate around the concept of security, see A. Aldis and G. Herd, Managing Soft Se-
curity Threats: Current Progress and Future Prospects, «European Security», Vol. 13, No. 1, 2004, pp. 169-
186; J. Lindley-French, The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Centu-
ry, «European Security», Vol. 13, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1-15. 
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tent at the local and regional level and, more often than not, in relation to 
non-state actors2. 
Since the beginning of the ’90, the debate on the enlargement of the se-
curity concept has involved all key international organizations and intergo-
vernmental cooperation mechanisms, each of which, within the perspective of 
adaptation to the new realities of the international system, gave different re-
sponses, creating new mechanisms for cooperation or, rather, adapting the exi-
sting ones. Within the European Union, debate and regulatory action aimed at 
adaptation to new threats to the security of Member States and their citizens, 
gradually focused on economic security and, in particular, on the closely rela-
ted energy security, here understood to be «a condition in which a nation and all, 
or most of its citizens and business have access to sufficient energy resources at reaso-
nable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of major disruption of 
service»3.  
If, therefore, the concept of energy security revolves around the need for 
an adequate supply of resources at reasonable prices, different factors come into 
play in determining what is concretely meant by energy security and how to 
effectively pursue a strategy aimed at its protection. First of all, as Stern sug-
gests4, we must distinguish between the need to ensure the availability of 
“short-term supply” – which takes into account technical and contingent issues 
– and the goal of ensuring “long-term supply”. Under the latter perspective – 
taken up in this study, strategic factors of a political and infrastructural nature 
come into play, which pertain in the first instance to relations between the EU 
and energy producing and supplying states. 
A further distinction concerns the nature of the policies aimed at safe-
guarding energy security. Indeed, security measures may be alternately placed 
in relation to energy demand, or rather to its supply5. Acting on energy de-
mand entails technical protection mechanisms primarily linked to the rationa-
lization and regulation of the internal energy market which, alone, seem insuf-
ficient to eliminate the risks associated with over-dependence on energy im-
ports – the main threat to energy security. This essay will hence focus on the 
protection mechanisms acting on the supply side that is the “external” dimen-
sion of energy security policies, which call into question the need for the Union 
to deal with third-party countries to ensure access to resources and their tran-
                                                          
2 See K. Becher and H. Schmidt, Soft security with Russia after 11 September, «Russian Regional Perspecti-
ves Journal», Vol. 1, No. 1. 
3 G. Bahgat, Europe’s energy security: Challenges and Opportunities, «International Affairs», Vol. 82, No. 5, p. 
965. In the same sense, S. Haghighi, Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the European Union 
with Major Oil and Gas Supplying Countries, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 14. 
4 J. Stern, Security of European Gas Supplies: The Impact of Import Dependence and Liberalization, London, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002, p. 6. 
5 S. Haghighi, Energy Security…, cit., p. 16. 
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sport. A corollary of this approach is, therefore, a special emphasis on the po-
litical – rather than economic – nature of energy security policies6. 
Based on the reconstruction of the process that led to the formulation of 
the concept of European energy security – in its long-term and external dimen-
sions – the aim of this paper is to analyze the role that the Caspian basin in 
general, and Azerbaijan in particular, came to play in such a construction in 
the increasingly urgent perspective of diversifying EU energy suppliers and 
supply routes. 
2.1.  EU Energy Vulnerabilities: Rising Demand, Declining Production, 
Concentration of Suppliers 
The European Union is the world’s third largest energy consumer after China 
and the United States. Although the post-2008 economic downturn has had a 
negative impact on primary energy demand, the EU Member States’ need for 
energy is estimated to grow at an average annual rate of 0.2 per cent until 
2035, reaching the equivalent of 1,731 million tonnes of oil7. Along with the 
growth in demand, the decline in domestic production will result in a deepen-
ing of dependency on fossil fuel imports. The increasing dependency on im-
ports is particularly evident in the case of natural gas, for which demand is set 
to grow proportionally more than demand for other primary sources. Indeed, 
while oil demand will slowly decline over the above-mentioned timeframe8, the 
steadier decline in coal and nuclear consumption – prompted by EU environ-
mental and energy-efficiency concerns and regulations – will be compensated 
primarily by the increasing use of natural gas and renewable energy sources.  
With a projected 30 per cent share of the energy mix, by 2035 natural gas 
is set to become the first primary energy source consumed in EU Member 
States. Between 2010 and 2035 annual gas consumption will rise from 547 to 
594 billion cubic meters (bcm). In the same timeframe, however, domestic gas 
production is expected to fall from 201 to 84 bcm/y, increasing the rate of EU 
dependency on imports from the current 63 per cent to 86 per cent. Only the 
development of EU indigenous unconventional gas deposits might partially 
reduce the growth in imports, potentially reducing the rate of dependency on 
imports to 74 per cent. Anyhow, under both scenarios the EU will need a sub-
                                                          
6 In this, the study follows the approach of Luciani, who emphasizes the central role that diplomacy has played 
in the past – and will continue to play in the future – in ensuring security of energy supply for international ac-
tors. G. Luciani, Security of Supply for Natural Gas Markets: What is it and what is it not, INDES Working Pa-
per No. 2, 2004, p. 6. As for the internal and economic perspective of analysis on European energy security, C. 
Egenhofer and T. Law, Security of Energy Supply: A Question for Policy or the Market, Brussels, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2002. 
7 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2011, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2011, p. 81. 
8 EU demand for oil will decrease between 2010 and 2035 from 11.9 to 9.3 million barrels per day. Ibidem, p. 
107. 
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stantial increase in gas import volumes, ranging from 134 to 164 bcm com-
pared with the 2010 level9. A different trend is foreseen in the EU oil sector. 
Here, notwithstanding the decline in indigenous production, after 2020 the 
contraction in EU oil demand is set to reduce imports from 9.8 million barrels 
per day (mb/d) to 8.8 mb/d in 203510. 
Figure 2.1. EU energy mix (2009 and 2035) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependency on external suppliers of fossil fuels does not in itself pose a 
threat to energy security, at least not as long as the consumer party has access 
to a sufficiently stable and diversified supply network. This is not, however, 
                                                          
9 International Energy Agency, Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2012 p. 129. 
10 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook…, cit., p. 92. 
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the case for the European Union, whose import network seems to be neither 
diversified nor stable enough, threatening to turn its energy dependence into a 
source of vulnerability. Indeed, 58 per cent and 76 per cent of the EU oil and 
gas supply respectively is provided by just three major producers, and – as per-
fectly shown by the Arab Spring – the producing areas are plagued by cyclic 
instability, thus threatening the stability of supply. 
Figure 2.2. EU oil and gas imports (2010) 
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The relationship between import dependency and energy insecurity is es-
pecially true with regard to gas, due to the peculiarities of its market and 
against the backdrop of the growing “strategicity” of EU gas use11. Unlike the 
oil market, which is global and includes many operators and producers com-
peting with each other, the natural gas market is fragmented on a regional 
scale and with less competition, both on the demand and the supply side. Be-
hind this difference lies primarily infrastructural data. Unlike oil, which can be 
transported by rail or by sea, gas necessitates piping and has a transport pro-
cess that is “rigid” by definition. This means that – unlike oil and despite the 
growth of the gas spot market and European continental trading hubs – gas 
exchanges are largely based on bilateral contracts that bind buyers and sellers 
in the long term (usually 20-25 years) and are generally accompanied by take-
or-pay clauses. Furthermore, a similar trend also occurs in the case of trade in 
LNG, a potentially more flexible source which producers prefer to manage 
through long-term contracts, similar to those utilized for pipelines. Thus, if an 
interruption of supply from an oil producer can be replaced through the inter-
national markets – as demonstrated by the recent Libyan crisis – in the case of 
gas such substitutability does not exist. The rigidity of the gas market hence 
obliges consumer countries to apply a more forward-looking strategic policy 
for planning and investment, with a view to securing a sufficiently stable and 
diversified supply network. In addition, such strategic planning is not confined 
to the economic sphere. Tying together producers and consumers over the 
long-term, the gas market normally requires a wider entente between the two 
sides, which entails a higher degree of political entente and consequently a 
greater role for policy makers and so-called energy diplomacy. This considera-
tion is all the more urgent since the distance between gas producing and mar-
keting areas often requires the involvement of transit states. 
From the EU perspective, the rigidity of the gas market has another rel-
evant implication related to its Member States’ different degrees of dependen-
cy on imports and their different degrees of diversification. Indeed, due to 
both geographical and historical reasons the Central and Eastern European 
Member States rely heavily on gas imports from the Russian energy champion 
                                                          
11 The increasing strategic role of gas use in the EU is primarily linked to its growing share of power generation. 
According to the latest Eurogas data, the share of gas in electricity production increased from 8.5% in 1990 to 
23.1% in 2009, contrary to the other traditional energy sources whose share declined in the same timeframe 
(coal from 39% to 25.3%, nuclear from 30.5% to 27.5%, oil from 8.5% to 2.9%). Moreover, due to the fore-
seeable reduction in nuclear energy use and to EU policies aimed at decarbonisation in power generation – in 
line with the European Union Emissions Trading System – the share of gas will steadily rise in the mid and long 
term periods. Eurogas, Gross electricity production by fuel, EU-27, web database, http://epp.eurostat.ec. 
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/database; As for the “key role” of gas in EU energy policies, see Eu-
ropean Commission, Energy roadmap 2050, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2012, p. 
12. 
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Gazprom12, which they perceive as an unreliable supplier – if not a threat13 – 
due to its closeness to the Kremlin and its role in Russian foreign policy plan-
ning. Such a perception has been reinforced in recent years by the aggressive 
energy policy Moscow has implemented vis-à-vis energy transit states such as 
Belarus and Ukraine, which has resulted in the cutoff of gas deliveries and 
hence in disruption of supply to those Central and Western European states 
whose supply network transits through their territory. The “gas-crisis” – the 
worst of which occurred in 2006 and 2009 – contributed to highlighting two 
dangerous sources of vulnerability for EU energy security. First and foremost, 
the crisis openly showed the risks arising from excessive dependence on a sin-
gle supplier, Russia, for a vital energy resource such as gas. Moreover, by 
deepening suspicions about Russia’s reliability as a fair energy supplier14, the 
crisis showed that ddiscrepancies in dependence on gas imports in general and 
Russian supplies in particular generate a deep gap in perceptions among EU 
Member States, which threatens to undermine the very foundation of Europe-
an integration itself that is intra-EU solidarity. 
Hence, the growing share of gas in the EU energy mix, the rigidity of its 
market, higher concentration of suppliers, and instability of the external pro-
ducing areas, as well as the alleged political use of energy leverage, give gas 
high strategic stakes, making diversification of suppliers and supply routes an 
absolute priority with a view to safeguarding the Union’s energy security. 
2.2.  The Evolution of the EU Energy Security Concept  
Notwithstanding the central role played by energy cooperation in the founda-
tion of the European integration process – historically seen as a tool for ensur-
ing peace in the continent and raising the living standards of its citizens – the 
EU is largely unprepared to face twenty-first century energy security challeng-
es. First and foremost, the lack of a common energy policy was the result of 
the reluctance of its Member States to devolve sovereign prerogatives in a 
                                                          
12 Although the following data have to be weighted with the relative quotas enjoyed by natural gas in each 
country’s energy mix, in 2011 supplies from Russia accounted for 100% of gas imports in the Baltic Republics, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, 85.7% in Poland, 84.5% in Hungary and 78.7% of Greece’s gas imports. Bp, 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012, web edition, www.bp.com/statisticalreview. 
13 A case in point is, for example, Poland whose traditional mistrust of Kremlin policies translated into the rai-
sing of dependence on Russian gas supplies to the most significant national security risk in the 2007 National 
Security Strategy. See, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, 2007, web edition, 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Poland-2007-eng.pdf, (last retrieved on 30 August 2012). 
14 It is worth noting that the perception of Russia exploiting its supplier position as a political tool is also shared 
by EU institutions. Referring to the gas crisis, the Economic and Social Committee stressed the «realization [they 
stirred up] that Europe’s energy dependency was not only of huge economic significance, but above all, that the 
supply of energy could readily be used as a weapon for exerting political pressure». Opinion of the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee on “Energy supply: what kind of neighbourhood policy do we need to ensure secu-
rity of supply for the EU”, «Official Journal of the European Union», C132, 3 May 2011, p. 15. 
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sphere, such as energy, traditionally considered to have high strategic value15. 
Hence, despite energy dependence being already recognized as a threat to the 
fundamental objectives of the Community16, EU legislation kept focusing its en-
ergy policy on the creation of an efficient internal market, on the assumption 
that this would have helped to eradicate the problem of external dependence17.  
Following the silence of the Treaties of Maastricht (1993), Amsterdam 
(1997) and Nice (2000) on means to ensure adequate levels of energy supply, the 
principles of energy security protection from the outside and through common 
action have emerged gradually, thanks to the proactive role played by the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) and since the November 2000 publication of the Green 
Paper Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply18. Here for 
the first time, the EC placed emphasis on the Union’s structural weaknesses, en-
visaging the need to adopt an active energy policy capable of freeing the Union 
from its increasing energy dependency. Moreover, moving toward a different 
understanding of energy security policies, the Green Book put forward the need 
to conceive energy policy from an angle other than that of the internal market, 
harmonization, environment or taxation, questioning the efficacy of a purely 
economic approach to the problem of external dependence and wondering if a 
“geopolitical” approach was not preferable for tackling it19.  
Included in the 2003 EU Security Strategy as one of the global challen-
ges of special concern for Europe20, the energy security issue quickly rose to 
the top of the EU policymakers’ agenda mainly due to the first gas supply di-
sruptions caused by the allegedly politically-motivated crisis between Russia 
                                                          
15 The EU Member States’ position reflects the wider debate, among economists, on the most appropriate 
means to ensure the efficiency of the energy market. On the one hand is the position of those who maintain the 
need to provide the Union with the necessary regulatory tools to pursue a coherent energy strategy – a position 
based on the consideration of the states’ growing interdependence and on the impact of policy choices of one 
of them on the others. On the other hand lies the vision of those who advocate a priority role of the states, 
which by knowing the dynamics of their markets better, can more effectively ensure their own energy security 
needs. This debate occurs in the broader context of the dichotomy between supporters of a liberal approach to 
the European energy issue – based on confidence in the self-regulation capability of the markets – and suppor-
ters of decisive intervention by the EU institutions. Driven by geostrategic rather than economic considerations, 
the latter view is aimed on the one hand at counteracting the policies of the EU’s competitors and on the other 
hand at bridling energy companies’ freedom of action, which may prove to be counterproductive to the interests 
of the Union. As for the “liberal” view, see C. Egenhofer and T. Legge, Security of Energy Supply, cit.; as for 
the “geostrategic” view, A. Correlje and C. Van der Lindeb, Energy supply security and geopolitics: A Euro-
pean perspective, «Energy Policy», Vol. 34, 2006, pp. 532-543. 
16 See, for example, Council of the European Union, New Community Energy Policy Objectives for 1995 and 
Convergence of the Policies of the Member States, «Official Journal of the European Union», C/241/1, 16 
September 1986.  
17 S. Haghighi, Energy Security…, cit., p. 63. For a panorama of the “internal” projection of EU energy policy 
and the lack of its connection with “external” measures, see ibidem, pp. 103-186. 
18 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply, 
COM(2000) 769 final, 29 November 2000. 
19 Ibidem, pp. 4 and 13. 
20 Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy, Bruxelles, 
12 December 2003, web edition, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (last retrieved on 30 
August 2012), p. 3. 
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and the Eastern European transit states. Moreover, adding urgency to the 
need to tackle the energy security issue, the 2004 enlargement – as would be 
the case for the 2007 one – deepened EU energy dependency in general and gas 
dependency on Russia in particular, against the backdrop of steadily increas-
ing hydrocarbon prices. Energy cooperation hence also came to be regarded as 
a tool for engaging external partners with a view to pursuing the creation of an 
arch of stability made up of a “ring of friends” beyond the EU’s borders21. 
A steppingstone for EU energy security new thinking as well as for the 
attempt to develop a common European Energy Policy (EEP) was the March 
2006 publication of the EC Green Paper A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy22. By raising the supply security to a key aim 
for the EU – along with sustainable development and competitiveness – the 
Green Paper emphasized energy security’s external dimension, the coherent pur-
suing of which was not by chance mentioned as one of the priorities in order to 
achieve a comprehensive European energy policy. Common action by its Mem-
ber States was, from the EC perspective, a logical prerequisite for coherent ex-
ternal action able to address XXI century challenges. Indeed, only by speaking 
with “a common voice” on energy questions, might the EU have exploited its 
weight – both in terms of market scale and policy range – to protect and assert 
its interests. Based on the strength guaranteed to the EU by joint action of its 
members, the Green Book put forward two key goals – and respective instru-
ments – which, from then onwards, would have shaped EU policies aimed at sa-
feguarding energy security in its long-term and external dimensions.  
The first was promotion of energy partnerships with producer and tran-
sit countries. Based on the assumption of interdependency between the EU 
and its energy partners, such engagement involved deepening the dialogue with 
major international energy suppliers as well the promotion of a common regu-
latory space aimed at bringing partners and neighbors closer to the EU’s inter-
nal market and facilitating the flow of investments. The second goal put forward 
by the EC in 2006 was a “clear policy on securing and diversifying energy sup-
plies” which, by recognizing the intra-EU dependency discrepancies, was regar-
ded as necessary both for the EU as a whole and for specific Member States or 
regions, as part of the wider attempt to enhance solidarity within the Union. The 
main tool for achieving the diversification goal – intended as the promotion of 
diversity in suppliers, transport routes and transport methods –hence became 
                                                          
21 R. Prodi, “A Wider Europe A Proximity Policy as the key to stability”, speech delivered at “Peace, Security 
And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”, Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Pro-
ject, Bruxelles, 5-6 December 2002, [SPEECH/02/619], p. 4; As for the nexus between energy cooperation and 
stability promotion in the neighborhood, see also Commission of the European Communities, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, on the development of energy policy for 
the enlarged European Union, its neighbours and partner countries, COM(2003)262 !nal, 13 May 2003. 
22 Commission of the European Communities, A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy, COM(2006)105 final, Bruxelles, 8 March 2006. 
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the upgrading and construction of the infrastructure deemed necessary for the 
security of EU energy supplies, especially in the gas sector. 
The diversification policy was pursued mainly through the development 
of the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E), whose original purpose 
was to provide a more political impulse to energy infrastructure investment, 
and which underwent a significant change in strategy and operational ap-
proach since 2003. Indeed, the 2003 TEN-E guidelines marked the transition 
from a “bottom-up approach” consisting of evaluating projects of common 
interest originating from the field, to a “top-down strategy” built on the identi-
fication of axes for priority projects. In this way, EU institutions introduced a 
hierarchy among projects of common interest, giving higher priority to those 
deemed crucial for tackling the increased dependence on gas imports23. 
Against this backdrop, the 2006 TEN-E guidelines revision introduced a fur-
ther hierarchization among energy projects by labeling as “of European inter-
est” mature projects located on a priority axis which have a cross-border na-
ture (or a significant impact on cross-border transmission capacity) and con-
tributed to strengthening security of supply in the Community. Moreover, in 
order to politically support and speed up the construction of gas pipelines of 
European interest encountering significant delays or implementation difficul-
ties, the 2006 guidelines put forward the possibility of appointing a European 
coordinator responsible for the coordination of national procedures, as well as 
for the promotion of the European dimension of the project and cross-border 
dialogue24.  
The tendency to build EU external energy policy on the strengthening of 
dialogue with partners and on infrastructural policy was confirmed in 2008 by 
both the Green Paper Towards a Secure, Sustainable and Competitive European 
Energy Network and the Second Energy Strategic Review25. Underlining once 
again the imperative need for EU Member States to enhance solidarity and 
joint actions both internally and beyond the Union’s borders, these documents 
                                                          
23 Decision No 1229/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 laying down 
guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC, «Official Journal of the 
European Union», L176, 26 June 2003, pp. 11-28; See also Commission of the European Communities, Re-
port from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of guidelines for trans-European energy net-
works in the period 2002-2004, COM(2006)443 final, Bruxelles, 7 August 2006. 
24 Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 laying 
down guidelines for trans-European energy networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC and Decision No 
1229/2003/EC, «Official Journal of the European Union», L262, 22 September 2006, pp. 1-23; See also, 
Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implemen-
tation of trans-European energy networks in the period 2007-2009, COM(2010)203 final, Bruxelles, 4 May 
2010. 
25 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a secure, sustainable and competitive European 
energy network, COM(2008)782 final, Bruxelles, 13 November 2008; Second Strategic Energy Review. An EU 
Security and Solidarity Action Plan, COM(2008)781 final, Bruxelles, 13 November 2008.  
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focused on the strengthening and integration of the internal infrastructure 
network and on its connection to the “essential infrastructure” bringing sup-
plies from third-party countries and allowing supply route diversification. 
Once again, special emphasis was placed on securing a stable and diversified 
gas supply scheme, which the EC deemed to be necessary notwithstanding the 
ambitious targets for renewables development put forward by the EU in the 
20-20-20 strategy. Moreover, with the backdrop of the January 2009 gas dis-
ruptions caused by the Russo-Ukrainian crisis and before the first signs of one 
of the toughest economic and financial crisis ever to be faced by Europe, the 
strategic role of natural gas in ensuring EU economic development and well-
being was certified by the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)26. Pre-
sented by the EC in November 2008, the stimulus package made available an 
unprecedented amount of funds (€3.9 billion) to finance a critical and mature 
energy infrastructure, this being an accelerator of investments in infrastructure 
aimed at both stimulating recovery from the economic downturn and fostering 
EU energy security objectives in terms of diversification. Significantly, the 
EERP marked a relevant shift in the EU’s energy sector funding, as for the 
first time it went beyond mere support to feasibility studies – traditionally 
granted within the TEN-E framework – providing funds contributing to the 
project implementation phase, and hence giving new impetus to an infrastruc-
ture experiencing financial hurdles. 
Consistently with the above picture, the steady attention devoted by the 
EU institutions – and particularly the EC – to the external dimension of ener-
gy security has been confirmed by the documents released in the last two years, 
setting proposals and action plans for the short and mid-term27. Indeed, 
alongside the need for the EU to ensure the functioning of internal markets 
and foster the development of renewable energy sources, cooperation with 
non-EU partners and diversification of suppliers and the supply channel re-
main at the top of EU policymakers’ priorities in line with the Lisbon Treaty 
provisions28.  
As for the priority given to the development of a strategic energy infra-
structure, the EC has recently called for an overhaul review of the TEN-E 
                                                          
26 Commission of the European Communities, A European Economic Recovery Plan, COM(2008)800, 26 No-
vember 2008; See also EERP Regulation (EC) N°663/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 establishing a programme to aid economic recovery by granting Union financial assistance to 
projects in the field of energy, «Official Journal of the European Union», L200, 31 July 2009, pp. 31-44.   
27 See for instance the European Parliament resolution A new Energy Strategy for Europe 2011-2020, «Official 
Journal of the European Union», C 99, 3 April 2012, pp. 64-77; 
28 Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty (on the functioning of the European Union) put forward the EU’s energy poli-
cy competences, which shall aim to: (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of 
energy supply; (c) promote energy efficiency and saving; (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
Moreover, according to article 171(1), «the Union shall establish a series of guidelines covering the objectives, 
priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of trans-European networks; these guidelines 
shall identify projects of common interest». 
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framework that is for a new EU infrastructure policy aimed at promoting the 
completion of priority projects through a dedicated budget – estimated at €9.1 
bln for gas infrastructures in the 2014-2020 period29 – and likely to be partially 
allocated to the implementation phase of those projects which are not viable 
under existing market conditions30. At the same time, the need to expand coo-
peration with key suppliers and transit countries through mutually beneficial 
energy partnerships, and to include the promotion of energy infrastructure de-
velopment in EU external relations, has been readdressed by the EC with the 
September 2011 communication The EU Energy Policy31. Urging the Union to 
«to take a strong, effective and equitable position on the international stage to secure 
the energy it needs», the EC focused its proposal for the consistent development 
of an external energy policy around four main objectives, consisting of: 
! building up the external dimension of our internal energy market; 
! strengthening partnerships for secure, safe, sustainable and competitive 
energy; 
! improving access to sustainable energy for developing countries; 
! better promoting EU policies beyond its borders. 
2.3.  Caspian Region’s and Azerbaijan’s Place in EU Energy Security Policies 
from the PCA to the EaP 
Against the backdrop of the EEP’s gradual development and since the issue of 
the 2000 Green Paper, the exploitation and transportation of the significant 
and largely unexploited Caspian Sea energy resources32 has become a priority 
with a view to the diversification of energy suppliers and, generally speaking, 
to safeguard EU energy security from beyond EU borders33.  
                                                          
29 European Commission, A Budget for Europe 2020, COM(2011)500 final, Part I and II, Bruxelles, 29 June 
2011. 
30 As for the EC proposal, European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No1364/2006/EC, 
COM(2011)658 final, Bruxelles, 19 October 2011. 
31 European Commission, The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders, 
COM(2011)539 final, Bruxelles, 7 September 2011. 
32 According to the latest Bp data, the Caspian countries jointly possess 38.2 thousand million barrels of proved 
reserves of oil and 29.1 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, equivalent to 2.3% and 14% of world proved oil and 
gas reserves respectively. Bp, BP Statistical Review… cit., web edition, www.bp.com/statisticalreview (last 
retrieved on 30 August 2012), pp.6; 20. For the sake of this article, apart from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan, the Caspian region also includes Uzbekistan, although it is not a littoral state of the basin. Its in-
clusion is justified by its potential contribution to developing an energy corridor running from Central Asia to 
Europe. Moreover, EU institutions themselves tend to include Uzbekistan within the scope of their energy poli-
cies, although domestic political conditions in this Central Asian country do not allow a deepening of the coope-
ration for the time being. See, for instance, Commission of the European Communities, Second Strategic 
Energy Review. An EU Security and Solidarity Action Plan, COM(2008)781 final, Bruxelles, 13 November 
2008, p. 4. 
33 See Commission of the European Communities, Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply..., cit., p. 75. The need to engage Caspian region producing states – and, at the same time, the central 
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The production potential of the Caspian basin is, however, partially off-
set by the difficulty in accessing and transporting its resources. Indeed, land-
locked and with no direct access to European markets, the basin’s states 
emerged from Soviet dissolution with a Russo-centric energy export network – 
a network which reinforced Russian energy leverage vis-à-vis the EU, giving 
the basin the “dual role” of energy producer and transit country. From this 
perspective, although Azerbaijan has a significant but limited share of Caspian 
hydrocarbon reserves34, its value to the European diversification policy is not 
confined to its role of energy producer. Indeed, due to its strategic location on 
the Western shore of the Caspian Sea, wedged between Russia to the north 
and Iran to the south, Azerbaijan plays a potentially key transit role for hy-
drocarbons produced on the Eastern side of the basin. 
Being the “cork in the bottle”35 for the direct transportation of Caspian 
energy resources to European markets, Azerbaijan has emerged as the key re-
gional actor in the competition developed since the mid 90s, aimed at breaking 
the Russian monopsony over the purchase of Caspian hydrocarbons. This aim 
was achieved through the opening of an Azerbaijani-Georgian-Turkish oil and 
gas corridor36 which, besides its own significance, could have represented the 
western stretch of a longer East-West corridor linking Central Asia to Europe. 
It is worth noting that throughout the 90s, regional energy competition 
evolved without EU direct involvement, notwithstanding the crucial role 
played by European energy companies – from Bp to Eni, Total and Statoil. 
Keeping a low-profile approach, the EU limited its involvement in the so-
called “Great Game” to offering technical and financial support under the 
TACIS and INOGATE programs, while the critical political support came in-
stead from the US Administration. Indeed, it was not until the emergence of a 
clearer EU external energy policy that Caspian resource development became 
a priority target for Brussels, and Azerbaijan consequentially came to be re-
garded as a strategic actor due to its twofold role of energy producer and 
transit country for Central Asian hydrocarbons. Hence, although Azerbaijan 
                                                                                                                                                    
role played by the Commission in such an attempt– was highlighted in May 2003 by the communication ad-
dressed by the EC to the Parliament and the Council in which, by widening the scope of the emerging Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Caspian region was listed among those with which the EU was called 
upon to cooperate in order to: (a) face the challenges of growing external energy dependence; (b) address in-
frastructure issues on a regional level; (c) diversify sources of energy geographically and technologically; (d) 
broaden the basis for energy trade in the European continent and its adjoining continents. Commission of the 
European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
on the development of energy policy for the enlarged European Union, neighbours and partner countries, 
COM(2003)262 final, Brxelles, 26 May 2003, pp. 4-5. 
34 Azerbaijan possesses 18.3% and 4.4% of Caspian area proved oil and gas reserves. Bp, BP Statistical Re-
view…, cit., pp. 6; 20. 
35 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, 
New York, 1997, p. 46. 
36 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines were inaugurated on the route 
which links Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia in May 2005 and in December 2006 respectively.  
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signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU in 1996 
(in force since July 1999), and although energy cooperation was already in-
cluded in the cooperation scheme thereby put forward37, it was the EU’s in-
creasing focus on diversification of both suppliers and supply routes which 
made Azerbaijan the key partner for the development of Brussels’ energy poli-
cies since the mid 2000s. 
Against this backdrop, EU-Azerbaijani energy cooperation was progres-
sively stepped up in line with the guidelines for external action spelled out by 
the 2006 Green Paper – that is the fostering of dialogue with energy partners 
and their engagement in EU diversification policies. The central role of Azer-
baijan in the EU diversification policy emerged since 2003 and the review of 
the guidelines for the development of trans-European energy networks. Con-
sistently with the new “top-down strategy” thereby put forward, the European 
Parliament and the European Council listed a gas corridor between the Caspi-
an Sea countries and the Middle East to the EU among the five axes for priori-
ty projects (NG3), hence prioritizing existing gas pipeline projects having 
Azerbaijan as their main gas source. The reference relates to Nabucco, Inter-
connector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) – 
the latter enjoying “common interest” project status – whose concepts were 
put forward after 2001 by the energy companies involved. EU backing of pipe-
line projects running through the NG3 axis represented the EU’s first concrete 
step into competition aimed at accessing and transporting Caspian region gas 
resources. In doing so, the EU took over the US project of an East-West ener-
gy corridor linking Central Asia to Western markets, prompting the idea of a 
fourth EU gas supply channel – alongside the Norwegian, Russian and North 
African ones. Indeed, although the fourth supply channel – which came to be 
defined the “Southern Corridor” in 2008 – was conceived to benefit from a 
multi-source supply scheme, since its initial proposition it was closely linked to 
the possibility of receiving gas supplies from Turkmenistan, through a Trans-
Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) whose concept was put forward after 1998 un-
der US political aegis38.  
Stepping up the effort to open the Southern Corridor, the 2006 TEN-E 
guidelines labeled Nabucco and ITGI as projects of European interest, giving 
the highest priority to their realization39. Moreover, in order to support the 
                                                          
37 Council and Commission decision of 31 May 1999 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement between European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, of the other part, «Official Journal of the European Union», L246, 17 September 1999, pp. 1-51; 
See also Resolution on the economic and commercial aspects of the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, of the other part, «Official Journal of the European Union», C115 , 14 April 1997, p. 193. 
38 As for the development of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline concept, see N. Badykova, Turkmenistan’s quest 
for economic security, in G. Chufrin, The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford, 2001, pp. 231-243. 
39 Decision No. 1364/2006/EC…, cit., p. 10. 
EU Energy Security Policies and Azerbaijan 
57 
rapid development of the Southern Corridor, both Nabucco and ITGI-
Poseidon – that is the interconnection between Greece and Italy – were listed 
among the ‘relatively small number of highly strategic projects’ which the 
EERP aimed at stimulating through the granting of fresh funding40. In addi-
tion, exploiting the possibility provided by the 2006 TEN-E guidelines, the EC 
anticipated through the 2007 Priority Interconnection Plan its intention to as-
sign a European coordinator to the Nabucco project41. The subsequent ap-
pointment of the Dutch Foreign Minister Jozias Aartsen to the post signaled 
the gradual rise of Nabucco – the only pipeline project assigned with a coordi-
nator – to the top of the EU energy diversification agenda and, on the other 
hand, the deepening of EC political investment in promotion of the Southern 
Corridor. Indeed, although the EU, with the ultimate aim of facilitating diver-
sification of the Union’s gas supply, officially supports all pipeline projects 
running through the Southern Corridor, it has nonetheless granted Nabucco 
with de facto political priority – first and foremost due to its huge planned 
transport capacity. 
The degree of political investment in the Southern Gas Corridor 
emerged clearly through the 2008 Second Strategic Energy Review42. Presenting 
the Corridor as “one of the EU’s highest energy security priorities”, the Re-
view called for a joint effort by the EC and Member States to work with the 
countries concerned – and Azerbaijan among them – in order to secure firm 
commitments for gas supply and construction of the necessary pipelines. Ac-
cordingly, the EC announced the possibility of setting up a block-purchasing 
mechanism for Caspian gas – the so-called Caspian Development Corporation 
(CDC)43 – aimed at aggregating Member States’ gas demand to be addressed 
through the Southern Corridor. Hence the CDC concept helped tackle two 
hurdles delaying the development of the Corridor. First and foremost, moving 
from the assumption that no country individually requires incremental gas 
volumes that are sufficient to underpin the investment in infrastructures, the 
CDC aimed to foster the added value of a joint consumers action, while, on 
the other hand, being instrumental in overcoming the “defensive attitude of 
gas producers”. The latter consideration is particularly relevant with regard to 
Brussels’ attempt to open a trans-Caspian supply channel from Turkmenistan 
to Azerbaijan, the importance of which was stressed by the Second Strategic 
                                                          
40 Nabucco and ITGI-Poseidon were granted 200 and 100 million euro respectively. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, Annex to the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the implementation of the European Energy Programme for Recovery, COM(2010)191 final, Bruxelles, 27 April 
2010, p. 8. 
41 Commission of the European Communities, Priority Interconnection Plan, COM(2006)846 final/2, Bruxelles, 
23 February 2007, p. 11. 
42 Commission of the European Communities, COM(2008)781 final…, cit.  
43 As for the development of the CDC concept and its operability, IHS CERA, Caspian Development Corpora-
tion. Final Implementation Report, December 2010. 
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Energy Review. Indeed, while Baku responded promptly and positively to EU 
engagement, the same was not the case with Ashgabat, which pursued a more 
differentiated export policy and a more conservative attitude to opening its na-
tional upstream sector to foreign investment. 
Besides being considered a potentially key energy partner in the EU’s at-
tempt to promote supplier and supply route diversification, Azerbaijan has 
been increasingly and directly engaged in energy dialogue and cooperation 
with the EU institutions, both bilaterally and within multilateral frameworks. 
Apart from the above-mentioned provisions of the 1999 PCA and the space 
devoted to energy cooperation in the framework of European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) Action Plans, the turning point for EU-Azerbaijani bilateral re-
lations was the signing in November 2006 – with the backdrop of guidelines 
for external action put forward by the 2006 Green Book – of a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) aimed at establishing a strategic partnership in the 
field of energy44. Recognizing Azerbaijan’s dual role of key producer and im-
portant transit country, the MoU promoted a shared vision of energy challen-
ges which, built upon the enhancement of interdependence, outlined a com-
prehensive and balanced approach in terms of respective commitments and in-
centives focused on four areas of cooperation: 
1. gradual harmonization of Azerbaijani legislation with EU legislation 
in the energy field; 
2. enhancing safety and security of supplies from Azerbaijan and the 
Caspian region to the EU; 
3. development of a comprehensive energy demand management policy 
in Azerbaijan; 
4. technical cooperation and exchange of expertise. 
It is worth noting that, as highlighted by the second area of cooperation, 
the MoU recognized the dual role of Azerbaijan as a key producer and im-
portant transit country and committed the parties to work together in order to 
support the development of the Central Asia-Europe energy corridor, identify-
ing and promoting additional hydrocarbon sources and supply routes to Azer-
baijan and onwards to the EU. 
As the drive to develop the Southern Gas Corridor progressed, Azerbai-
jan emerged as the most committed country to its realization and the only 
producing country concretely able and willing to supply it45. The Baku gov-
                                                          
44 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between European Union and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan in the field of Energy, Bruxelles, 7 November 2006, web edition, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
energy_transport/international/regional/caucasus_central_asia/memorandum/doc/mou_azerbaijan_en.pdf (last 
retrieved on 30 August 2012). 
45 Broadly speaking, the degree of Azerbaijani commitment to the development of projects aimed at diversifying 
EU supply routes and enhancing regional cooperation was further testified by the support provided, between 
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ernment’s political commitment to the development of the supply route was 
firstly spelled out on the occasion of the 2009 EU Southern Corridor Summit 
held in Prague. There, the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev– along with his 
EU Council, Turkish, Georgian and Egyptian counterparts – cosigned a decla-
ration expressing their full support for the realization of the Corridor, seen as 
an important and mutually beneficial initiative for both the enhancement of 
energy cooperation and the fostering of social, economic and political cooper-
ation in the whole region46.  
Politically, the most relevant reciprocal endorsement of energy coopera-
tion came in January 2011 with the visit to Baku of the EC President José Ma-
nuel Barroso and Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger. On that occasion, 
Barroso and Aliyev cosigned a joint declaration reaffirming the importance of 
the bilateral energy relationships and stressing the common objective to rapid-
ly establish the Southern Corridor, regarded as «a stepping stone in increasing 
European Energy security and a guarantee that the resources upon the territory of 
Azerbaijan can be developed in the expectation that sufficient infrastructure and mar-
kets as well as commercial conditions exist»47. 
The Azerbaijani commitment to supply the Southern Corridor – regard-
less of the selected route for gas transportation – represented the most concrete 
breakthrough for a concept which otherwise would have had limited possibili-
ties of realization. In this perspective, the January 2011 reciprocal commitment 
to cooperate for the realization of the Corridor paved the way to the unprece-
dented EU decision to endorse the EC, in September 2011, with the mandate 
to negotiate on behalf of Member States a legally binding treaty between the 
EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian Pipeline system. 
Along with the bilateral path of energy dialogue, Azerbaijan has been 
actively engaged by the EU through the multilateral frameworks for coopera-
tion launched since the second half of the 2000s with the backdrop of the 2004 
and 2007 enlargements. Underscoring the steady rise of Baku’s regional profile 
in relation to energy cooperation, in November 2004 Azerbaijan hosted a Min-
isterial Conference between the EU and fourteen states of the Caspian and 
Black Sea areas which launched the so-called “Baku Initiative” aimed at en-
hancing energy and transport cooperation among its participants. Since its in-
ception and through the creation of dedicated working groups, the Baku Initi-
ative has focused on four priority areas, consisting of energy market conver-
gence, energy security, sustainable energy development and investment attrac-
                                                                                                                                                    
2007 and 2008, to the concept of “Caspian-Black Sea-Baltic Energy Transit Space”, whose objective was to 
connect Caspian producers to the EU through Ukraine.  
46 The Declaration – Prague Summit, Southern Corridor, 8 May 2009, web edition www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/107598.pdf (last retrieved on 30 August 2012). 
47 Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor, Baku, 13 January 2011, web edition, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
energy/infrastructure/strategy/doc/2011_01_13_joint_declaration_southern_corridor.pdf (last retrieved on 30 
August 2012). 
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tion48. Against the backdrop of EU enlargement, the Baku Initiative empha-
sized two significant trends in EU policy for Azerbaijan and the Caspian area. 
On the one hand it highlighted the tendency to place this policy within the 
wider framework of the European neighbourhood strategy for the Black Sea 
area and, at the same time, to regard energy cooperation as one of its main pil-
lars. On the other hand and consequentially, the Baku Initiative showed that 
energy policy – besides being functional to EU security needs – provided a tool 
for the gradual approximation of partner countries to the acquis communau-
taire, as well as for the enhancement of cooperation and mutual trust among 
them. 
The above-mentioned tendencies also underlie the objectives put forward 
by the Black Sea Synergy (BSS), a regional cooperation mechanism launched 
in 2007 and based on the assumption that, with the backdrop of Bulgarian and 
Romanian accession to the EU, the prosperity, stability and security of the 
Eastern neighbours were of immediate concern to the Union49. In accordance 
with the Baku Initiative’s ratio, cooperation in the energy sector – along with 
the transport and environment sectors – was regarded by the BSS as an area of 
special dialogue with the Union, functional to build an entente likely to devel-
op into concerted action in favor of civil society.  
Energy cooperation also has a central role for the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) initiative, launched by the EC in December 2008 and aimed at bringing 
the Eastern neighbours closer to the EU by fostering their stability, govern-
ance and economic development50. Indeed, energy security was included as a 
cooperation area for both the EaP bilateral and multilateral tracks. While with 
specific reference to EU-Azerbaijani bilateral relations the agenda focused 
mainly on the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution, the strengthen-
ing of democracy and human rights51, energy security represented the third of 
the four policy platforms which form the framework’s multilateral track. Ac-
                                                          
48 See, Ministerial Declaration on Enhanced energy co-operation between the EU, the Littoral States of the 
Black and Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries, web edition, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
energy_transport/international/regional/caspian/doc/2006_11_30_astana_conclusions.pdf (last retrieved on 30 
August 2012). Referring to the “Baku Initiative”, the EC highlighted that «for the EU, the main objective of this 
initiative is to facilitate the transportation of the extensive Caspian oil and gas resources towards Europe […]. 
Indeed, secure and safe export routes for Caspian oil and gas will be important for the EU’s security of energy 
supply by increasing the geographical diversification of the EU’s external energy supplies. Supplying the EU 
market at competitive international prices will also be crucial for facilitating the economic, social and political 
development of countries of the Caspian region». Commission of the European Communities, What is at stake 
- Background document on the Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy, [SEC(2006)317/2], p. 40. 
49 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament Black Sea synergy - A new regional cooperation initiative, COM(2007)160 final, Bruxel-
les, 11 April 2007. 
50 Commission of the European Communities, Eastern Partnership, COM(2008)823 final, Bruxelles, 3 Decem-
ber 2008. 
51 European Commission - High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ea-
stern Partnership Roadmap 2012-13: the bilateral dimension, SWD(2012)109 final, Bruxelles, 15 May 2012. 
EU Energy Security Policies and Azerbaijan 
61 
cordingly with the decision endorsed by the first meeting of the dedicated wor-
king group in November 2009, energy security cooperation revolves around 
four key objectives:  
! enhancing framework conditions and solidarity;  
! support for infrastructure development, interconnection and diversifica-
tion of supply; 
! promotion of increased energy efficiency and use of renewable resources; 
! regulatory framework and approximation of energy policies. 
2.4.  EU Energy Policies Regarding Azerbaijan: Accomplishments, Constraints 
and Recommendations 
Since the beginning of the XXI century, the external dimension of EU energy 
security policies – and the consequent need to diversify energy suppliers and 
supply routes – has increasingly gained space within EU policy-making pro-
cesses. Hence, while addressing the external dimension of energy security has 
became a policy imperative for the EU, the promotion of the Southern Gas 
Corridor has emerged as one of its key initiatives and, at the same time, as one 
of the major political investments undertaken by the EC, which came to play a 
driving role in the development of a common European energy policy. It is in 
this context that Azerbaijan, with its double strategic value of energy producer 
and potential transit country, emerged both as a critical EU partner and a rel-
evant test case for evaluating the consistency between Brussels policies’ aims 
and means. Against this backdrop – and on the eve of allocation of Shah Den-
iz II (SDII) gas to one of the pipeline projects running through the Southern 
Corridor – it may be stated that Azerbaijan’s potential as a new EU gas sup-
plier has been successfully exploited, while its transit potential – at least for the 
time being – has not. 
Doubtless the EU, thanks to its support provided to pipeline projects 
through the TEN-E framework and the EERP, has been playing if not a deci-
sive, at least a relevant and facilitating role in ensuring the flow of Azerbaijani 
gas to European markets – regardless of which market will be definitively cho-
sen by the SDII consortium from the South-Western and the Central-Eastern 
ones. In particular, the EU has contributed to the projects’ advancement by 
providing them with political backing and public visibility while, at the same 
time, acting as a catalyst for international funding from IFIs (International 
Financial Institutions). Yet the EU institution’s role did not turn out to be de-
cisive in fostering the realization of projects of European interest. This was 
primarily due to the structural shortcomings of the TEN-E framework which, 
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as recognized by the EC itself52, lacks focus, flexibility and a top-down ap-
proach to overcome the hurdles faced by the infrastructures. Moreover, given 
the cross-border projects’ implementation delays caused by the different na-
tional authorization procedures, the EU still lacks the means to ensure consi-
stency between European and national energy infrastructure priorities that is 
to coordinate the prioritization of infrastructures at EU and Member State le-
vels. The road to overcome these shortcoming has already been identified by 
the EC through the renewed proposals for revision of the TEN-E scheme cur-
rently debated within EU institutions. Their endorsement would certainly pro-
vide the EU with more effective tools to address the political, financial and 
normative challenges posed by the construction of crucial cross-border infra-
structures. 
Since the beginning of the century, the evolution of competition for the 
transportation of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe has clearly shown that the 
main decisions and agreements leading to the forthcoming inauguration of the 
Southern Gas Corridor were taken above and outside EU initiatives and par-
ticipation. Indeed, the key role has thereby been played by energy companies 
with the direct or indirect support of their respective national institutions. 
While the primary role of private companies is inscribed in the market rules 
and in the bottom-up approach of the TEN-E provisions, Member States’ ex-
ternal energy policies have more often than not turned out to be contradictory 
and contrary to the spirit of intra-European solidarity that should represent 
the foundation of EU common energy policy. Indeed, the lack of agreement 
among EU Member States on the means to ensure their own energy security 
has resulted in deep rivalry bboth within and between the main European gas 
supply corridors – that is among rival projects within the Southern Corridor as 
well as between the Southern and Eastern Corridors themselves. Besides over-
shadowing Brussels’ preferences and guidelines, the unilateralist tendencies did 
not contribute to the overall transparency of energy competition and, at the 
same time, untied the interdependence knot which, from the EC perspective, 
should enhance the EU’s international position and bargaining power. Yet, 
the EU Member States’ tendency to pursue autonomous – when not contradic-
tory – external energy policies is mainly the result of their traditional unwill-
ingness to alienate sovereign prerogatives in a strategic sector such as energy 
and, all the more so, in relation to gas negotiations with key suppliers, which 
states prefer to manage bilaterally and within the wider framework of their 
own foreign policy vectors. From this viewpoint, the lack of coordination be-
tween the policies of governments and the EU institutions reflects the broader 
                                                          
52 See, for instance, European Commission, Report on the implementation of the Trans-European Energy 
Networks in the period 2007-2009, COM(2010)203 final, Bruxelles, 4 May 2010. 
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dichotomy between state and supranational prerogatives in the energy sector, 
which the Union’s founding Treaties have not yet resolved.  
In this context, the forthcoming opening of the Southern Gas Corridor’s 
“first leg” linking Azerbaijan to European markets is primarily the result of 
the convergence of energy companies’, Member States’ and EU institutions’ 
interests and policies. Hence, it is not by chance that the same success was not 
achieved where such convergence did not occur and, consequentially, the EU 
had to act as the main actor. This applies to the full exploitation of the Ca-
spian gas corridor which is – at best – still uncertain, due to a number of tech-
nical and political causes not entirely dependent on EU failures.  
First and foremost, full development of the Southern Corridor was hin-
dered by the unexpected consequences of the tough financial and economic 
crisis which has affected EU Member States since 2008. By reducing aggregate 
EU demand for gas, the crisis added uncertainty to the gas demand addressed 
to the Southern Corridor, against the backdrop of wider uncertainties resul-
ting from the potential development of unconventional gas in Eastern Europe 
and the greater availability of LNG on the market. In this context – while the 
stakeholders acting in the Azerbaijani leg of the Corridor were flexible enough 
to scale down the capacity of the most ambitious pipelines that is the Nabucco 
project – the huge investments required for the construction of a trans-Caspian 
gas pipeline proved to be economically unfeasible. Yet, the EC attempt to 
establish a mechanism for the aggregation of Member States’ gas demand was 
a step in the right direction. The CDC, however, has not materialized yet, and 
in the meantime the EU has been losing ground to international competitors – 
primarily China – which have proven to be more flexible and determined in 
opening a gas supply channel from Central Asian producers. 
Besides the consequences of economic hardship, it was however on polit-
ical grounds that the EU institutions failed in advancing the concept of the 
Southern Corridor’s Caspian leg. Basically, the EC has not been able to force 
the hand of those producers – primarily Turkmenistan – which, unlike Azer-
baijan, were less willing to cooperate actively with the EU by facilitating its ta-
sks. Indeed, while Baku has traditionally pursued an “open door policy” to-
ward foreign investments in energy and, most importantly, has actively contri-
buted to the infrastructural policy beyond its borders53, Ashgabat has under-
taken a resource nationalism course which has kept its upstream sector almost 
closed and, at the same time, prefers to sell gas at its borders and stay out of 
the pipeline politics. Hence, unable to aggregate Member States’ gas demand, 
                                                          
53 The reference relates primarily to the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, a project put forward in 2001 by Azerbaijani 
and Turkish national energy companies and aimed at transporting Shah Deniz II gas to the Turkish-EU border 
from 2017. The project was crucial in advancing the EU Southern Corridor concept, by circumventing many of 
the financial and technical difficulties faced by the European infrastructural projects. 
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the EC lacked an effective policy of both economic and political incentives ca-
pable of circumventing Turkmenistan’s closures. 
Moreover, the failure in advancing the Trans-Caspian project is also the 
result of the lack of a coherent regional policy, able to provide EU institutions 
with the necessary tools to address the political issues that underlie energy 
competition. Indeed, since the initial appearance of the Trans-Caspian project, 
the main hurdle for its realization has stemmed from the lack of agreement 
among riparian states on the legal status of the basin. A legal dispute, the lat-
ter, behind which traditionally lay opposing views on the development of the 
energy sector, as well as cross-claims over some offshore deposits – including, 
inter alia, those directly involving Baku and Ashgabat54. Yet, although the EC 
2011 mandate to negotiate a trilateral treaty aimed at building a Trans-
Caspian Pipeline represents a stepping stone for EU involvement in the basin’s 
politics, it seems unlikely for the EC to achieve a concrete breakthrough to-
ward construction of the pipeline, unless it is framed within a wider dialogue 
and mediation effort with all parties concerned – including Russia and Iran, 
traditionally opposed to the construction of the pipeline. Hence, the drive for 
the construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline shows the extent to which the 
presence of international relations “heavyweights” in the Caspian region limits 
EC influence in regional energy politics, making the Union’s external energy 
policy subject to the same contradictions characterizing the development of a 
coherent EU foreign policy. Yet, a concrete proposal aimed at both strength-
ening EU external energy policy and fostering its regional profile has recently 
come from the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). In a 2001 
exploratory opinion, the EESC suggested the appointment of a high repre-
sentative for energy policy alongside the high representative for foreign affairs 
and security policy, «given that energy security comes within these policy areas»55. 
If the EU has been successful in engaging Azerbaijan in its energy diver-
sification policies, the same has not occurred in its attempt to involve the 
country in the EU’s drive to extend its norms, rules and institutions beyond its 
borders with a view to creating a pan-European energy space. The attempt to 
gradually move from cooperation to integration failed notwithstanding the 
numerous frameworks within which it was pursued. In particular, Azerbaijan 
has not yet joined the 2005 Energy Community Treaty, a legally binding fra-
mework for non-discriminatory and market-based conditions for trade, transit 
and investment in energy products, regarded by the EU as the main instru-
                                                          
54 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have not yet found agreement on the demarcation of their respective sea bor-
ders in the Caspian Sea. Cross-claims on the offshore Serdar/Kypaz field represent the main hurdle toward 
bilateral entente. 
55 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Energy supply: what kind of neighbourhood 
policy do we need to ensure security of supply for the EU?, «Official Journal of the European Union», C 132, 3 
May 2011, p. 15.  
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ments for the expansion of its rules – and hence its soft power – to the 
neighbourhood. Hence despite the Azerbaijani oil industry’s proven reliability 
as a partner for the establishment of a favorable climate for investment and its 
participation in both the Energy Charter Treaty and the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, the country remains outside the gradual establishment 
of a common European legal space in the energy sector. Such a shortcoming 
reflects the failure of both bilateral energy engagement and the various multi-
lateral frameworks – from the Baku Initiative to the Black Sea Synergy and 
the Eastern Partnership – aimed at accomplishing the goal of fostering regio-
nal cooperation through the sharing of rules and the gradual adoption of the 
acquis communautaire.  
Generally speaking, the multilateral approach to the challenges posed by 
energy security has proved to be unsuccessful, and the EaP is no exception to 
this trend. Indeed, it did not bring about the “real step change” in bilateral and 
multilateral relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbors that it was 
supposed to provide, at least not in relation to Azerbaijan or with reference to 
energy security cooperation. While the progress in advancing the Azerbaijani 
leg of the Southern Corridor occurred outside the EaP framework, little was 
achieved between 2009 and 2011 with regard also to the key objectives of the 
multilateral track. Notwithstanding that enhancement of the cooperation to 
integrate partners’ and the EU’s energy markets through comprehensive ener-
gy sector reforms is a key policy objective for the 2012-2013 period56, it seems 
unlikely that EaP multilateral track will accomplish its goals. Indeed, the EaP 
exhibits most of the shortcomings of the Union’s external energy policy, first 
and foremost the lack of a wider and consistent regional strategy able to tackle 
the deepest political issues that impinge upon EaP countries’ foreign and ener-
gy policies – from the above-mentioned legal status of the Caspian Sea to the 
still unresolved regional conflicts. Unless the EU provides political depth to its 
regional economic and energy policies, its regional projection and more specif-
ically its energy cooperation objectives will basically depend on single coun-
tries’ goodwill and specific interests. Only by demonstrating that the EU – in 
the words of the EC – «is prepared to engage with the Caspian and the Middle East 
regions on a long term basis, both politically and economically»57, will it benefit 
from an incentive scheme able to provide Brussels with concrete influence over 
its partners’ policies. 
 
                                                          
56 European Commission - High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit, JOIN(2012)13 final, Bruxelles, 15 May 2012, p. 
14. 
57 European Commission, COM(2011)539 final…, cit., p. 5. 
